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STATEMENT OF THE CASE

Nature of the Case
Kevin Louis Ormesher appeals from his judgment of conviction for sexual abuse
of a minor. He asserts that the district court erred in instructing the jury because the
instructions created a fatal variance.

He also asserts that the district court erred in

concluding that his convictions for stalking and violating a no contact order were
relevant to his truthfulness.

Statement of the Facts and Course of Proceedings
At around 9:30 p.m. on July 27, 2010, fifteen-year-old AR. snuck out of her
father's house.

(Tr., p.179, Ls.7-9.)

She snuck out to meet up with Mr. Ormesher,

whom she had met at a wedding several days before; Mr. Ormesher was a OJ at the
wedding. (Tr., p.187, Ls.14-23.) According to AR., Mr. Ormesher pulled up in a yellow
sports car and she got into the passenger seat. (Tr., p.175, Ls.5-10.) She told him she
wanted to go to the woods behind her house, but he stated that he wanted to go
somewhere else, and they headed toward Canfield Mountain. (TL, p.175, Ls.14-18.)
She testified that Mr. Ormesher gave her a bottle of Tarantula tequila; she believed that
she took about 25-30 sips of the tequila. (Tr., p.175, Ls.21-25, p.180, Ls.12-13.)
They drove for about 15 minutes, talking about "how often I get drunk and stuff."
(Tr., p.177, Ls.3-5.) Once they arrived at the trailhead, according to AR., "we started
kissing. He started touching me. I wasn't really okay with it at first but kind of allowed it
to happen eventually as I got intoxicated." (Tr., p.179, Ls.19-22.) She testified that
Mr. Ormesher touched her breasts under her shirt and bra; he was in the driver's seat
leaning over and she was in the passenger seat. (Tr., p.181, Ls.1-23.) She believed
1

that this went on for about a half an hour, "but I started fogging out and blacking out so I
couldn't really tell you." (Tr., p.182, Ls.7-9.)
When the police arrived, AR.'s shirt and bra were off; she did not recall how that
happened.

(Tr., p.182, Ls.15-24.)

spoke to her; she was puking.

AR. could not recall her name when the police

(Tr., p.183, LsA-10.) An ambulance was eventually

called to scene due to AR.'s condition. (Tr., p.183, Ls.19-22.) AR. was questioned
about what happened that evening; "I didn't know if I was going to be like prosecuted for
it or - I was kind of scared so I told them nothing had happened, we were just drinking."
(Tr., p.184, Ls.9-11.)

She got in trouble with her parents for sneaking out, and told her

mother within the next day or two that an inappropriate touching occurred. (Tr., p.203,
Ls.15-22.)
Mr. Ormesher testified. He stated that on the evening in question, he received a
text message from AR., and she eventually asked him to come pick her up. (Tr., p.254,
Ls.7-9.)

He testified that she was the one who brought the bottle of tequila and

suggested they go to the trailhead. (Tr., p.255, L.1 - p.257, L.5.) She had already been
drinking when he pickedber up. (Tr., p.257, Ls.8-10.)
Mr. Ormesher testified that he did not kiss AR., "because she was starting to get
too drunk." (Tr., p.261, Ls.17-19.) He eventually took the bottle of tequila away from
her and gave her water. (Tr., p.261, Ls.20-25.) When asked how her shirt came off,
Mr. Ormesher stated,
After I had given her the water, she got out the car and she went to go
pee, and she actually fell down the hill and I had to go get her, and then
she got back in the car, and I said, 'Now you stay there,' and then she
took her shirt off, but then she - I told her, 'No, put that back on,' so she
put it back on.
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(Tr., p.262, Ls.12-17.) She did take her bra off, but did not say why, as she was not
speaking coherently by that time. (Tr., p.263, Ls.1-6.) Mr. Ormesher stated that when
he first arrived at the trailhead he applied the emergency break because the car would
roll otherwise. (Tr., p.264, Ls.20-23.) With the emergency break applied, it was "pretty
much impossible" to lean over the middle console to the passenger seat. (Tr., p.265,
Ls.11-13.) Mr. Ormesher testified that he never leaned over the emergency break and
touched A.R. (Tr., p.265, Ls.14-16.) He testified that he never took advantage of A.R.
and believed that he "took care of her." (Tr., p.267, Ls.24-25.)
During the defense case, Mr. Ormesher's uncle, Curtis, testified. When asked if
he had an opinion as to whether Mr. Ormesher was a "moral person," he responded:
Absolutely. I trust him - I'm semi-reclusive, and he's one of the only
people I would trust in my home when I take vacations. I trust him to
watch my cats. I trust him with everything. We go on jobs for some pretty
high-end clientele. Uh, I trust him in their offices, in their homes, and they
trust him, also. He doesn't pry into things. He's just trustworthy.
(Tr., p.360, Ls.2-B.) The State then sought to ask Curtis if his opinion would change
knowing that Mr. Ormesher had been convicted of stalking and violating a no-contact
order.

(Tr., p.3-64, Ls.10-20.)

Mr. Ormesher objected, asserting that such incidents

were not relevant to credibility and therefore not appropriate for cross-examination.
(Tr., p.365, Ls.21-25.) The district court overruled the objection, holding that, "both of
these offenses are probative as to the issue of honesty of the defendant," and were
highly probative. (Tr., p.367, Ls.6-14.)
Mr. Ormesher was charged with one count of sexual abuse of a child under the
age of sixteen years and one count of dispensing to a minor. (R., p.39.) Regarding the
first count, the Information specifically alleged:
That the Defendant, KEVIN LOUIS ORMESHER, over the age of
eighteen, to-wit: 25 years of age, on or about the 2th day of July, 2010, in
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the County of Kootenai, State of Idaho, did have sexual contact with AR.,
a child under the age of sixteen, to-wit: 15 years old, by touching the
breast of said child with the intent to gratify the sexual desire of the
Defendant.
(R., p.4D.) The Information thus specifically alleged the manner in which Mr. Ormesher
allegedly committed the instant offense: by touching the breast of AR.

(R., p.40.)

However, the elements instruction submitted to the jury did not contain this information.
The instruction stated,
In order for the defendant, KEVIN LOUIS ORMESHER, to be guilty of
Sexual Abuse of a Child Under the Age of Sixteen Years, as charged, the
state much prove each of the following:
1.

On or about the 2ih day of July, 2010;

2. In the State of Idaho;
3. The defendant, KEVIN LOUIS ORMESHER, had sexual contact with
AR. not amounting to lewd conduct;
4. The defendant, KEVIN LOUIS ORMESHER, was eighteen (18) years
of age or older;
5. AR. was under sixteen (16) years of age, and;
6. The defendant, KEVIN LOUIS ORMESHER, committed such an act
with the specific intent to gratify the sexyaL desire of the defendant.
(R., p.126.) "Sexual contact" was defined as "any physical contact between the child
and any person which is caused by the actor, or the actor causing the child to have self
contact." (R., p.129.) Thus, pursuant to the jury instruction, the jury could have found
Mr. Ormesher guilty of sexual abuse of a minor even if it did not find that he touched
AR.'s breast, even though this was specifically the act alleged in the Information.
Mr. Ormesher objected to the use of the jury instruction, asserting that, because
the charging document specifically set forth the manner in which Mr. Ormesher had
allegedly committing the crime, the jury instruction created a variance because it
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permitted him to be convicted by committed the crime in a different manner than what
was alleged.

(Tr., p.285, L.18 - p.287, L.13.)

The court used the instruction.

(R., p.126.)
Mr. Ormesher was convicted. (R., p.140.) The district court imposed a unified
sentence of six years, with two years fixed, and the court retained jurisdiction.
(R., p.157.)

Mr. Ormesher appealed.

(R., p.160.)

He asserts that the district court

erred in instructing the jury and erred by permitting the State to cross-examine
Mr. Ormesher's uncle regarding Mr. Ormesher's convictions.

5

ISSUES
1. Did the district court err in instructing the jury because the jury instructions
created an impermissible variance from the charging document?
2. Did the district court err by permitting the State to cross-examine Curtis
Ormesher regarding Mr. Ormesher's prior convictions?
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ARGUMENT
I.
The District Court Erred In Instructing The Jury Because The Jury Instructions Created
An Impermissible Variance From The Charging Document

A.

Introduction
The Information in this case specifically alleged that Mr. Ormesher committed

sexual abuse of minor by touching A.R.'s breasts. However, the elements instruction
contain no such limitation - it permitted the jury to find Mr. Ormesher guilty based on
any act of sexual contact. This created a variance.

B.

Standard Of Review
Whether the jury was properly instructed is a question of law over which the

appellate courts of this state exercise free review. State v. Jones, 125 Idaho 477,489
(1994); State v. Sundquist, 128 Idaho 780 (Ct. App. 1996).

"The existence of an

impermissible variance between a charging instrument and jury instructions is a
question of law over which we exercise free review." State v. Sherrod, 131 Idaho 56,57
(Ct. App. 1998).

C.

The District Court Erred In Instructing The Jury Because The Jury Instructions
Created An Impermissible Variance From The Charging Document
Mr. Ormesher was charged with one count of sexual abuse of a child under the

age of sixteen years and one count of dispensing to a minor. (R., p.39.) Regarding the
first count, the Information specifically alleged:
That the Defendant, KEVIN LOUIS ORMESHER, over the age of
eighteen, to-wit: 25 years of age, on or about the 27th day of July, 2010, in
the County of Kootenai, State of Idaho, did have sexual contact with A.R.,
a child under the age of sixteen, to-wit: 15 years old, by touching the
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breast of said child with the intent to gratify the sexual desire of the
Defendant.
(R., p.40.) The Information thus specifically alleged the manner in which Mr. Ormesher
allegedly committed the instant offense: by touching the breast of AR.

(R., p.40.)

However, the elements instruction submitted to the jury did not contain this information.
The instruction stated,
In order for the defendant, KEVIN LOUIS ORMESHER, to be guilty of
Sexual Abuse of a Child Under the Age of Sixteen Years, as charged, the
state much prove each of the following:
7.

On or about the 2ih day of July, 2010;

8. In the State of Idaho;
9. The defendant, KEVIN LOUIS ORMESHER, had sexual contact with
AR. not amounting to lewd conduct;
10. The defendant, KEVIN LOUIS ORMESHER, was eighteen (18) years
of age or older;
11.AR. was under sixteen (16) years of age, and;
12. The defendant, KEVIN LOUIS ORMESHER, committed such an act
with the specific intent to gratify the sexual desire of the defendant.
(R, p.126.) "Sexual contact" was defined as "any physical contact between the child

and any person which is caused by the actor, or the actor causing the child to have self
contact." (R., p.129.)
"The instructions to the jury must match the allegation in the charging document
as to the means by which a defendant is alleged to have committed the crime
charged." State v. Folk, 151 Idaho 327, 342 (2011) (citing State v. Hooper, 145 Idaho
139, 147 (2007) (emphasis added)). "Otherwise, there can be a fatal variance between
the jury instructions and the charging document." Id. "Also, the jury instruction must not
permit the defendant to be convicted of conduct that does not constitute the type of
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crime charged." Id. In this case, the State alleged that Mr. Ormesher committed sexual
abuse by touching AR.'s breasts. The jury instruction contained no restriction on the
type of sexual contact that could be used to convict Mr. Ormesher. The instruction,
therefore, did not match the allegation in the charging document and it created a
variance.

A determination of whether a variance is fatal depends on whether the basic
functions of the pleading requirement have been met. State v. Windsor, 110 Idaho 410,
417, (1985).

A charging instrument meets the basic functions of the pleading

requirement if it fairly informs the defendant of the charges against which he or she
must defend and enables him or her to plead an acquittal or conviction in bar of future
prosecutions for the same offense. United States v. Bailey, 444 U.S. 394, 395, (1980).
Therefore, a variance between a charging document and a jury instruction requires
reversal only when it deprives the defendant of his or her right to fair notice or leaves
him or her open to the risk of double jeopardy. See, e.g., Windsor, 110 Idaho at 417 -18;
Thus, a variance between the facts alleged in the pleading instrument and the proof at
trial generally will not be deemed fatal unless there has been such a variance as to
affect the substantial rights of the accused. Id. A review of whether the defendant was
deprived of his or her right to fair notice requires the court to determine whether the
record suggests the possibility that the defendant was misled or embarrassed in the
preparation or presentation of his or her defense. Windsor, 110 Idaho at 418.
Mr. Ormesher was prejudiced.

The charging document put Mr. Ormesher on

notice that he had to defend against an allegation that he touched A R. 's breasts.
However, due to the jury instruction, he had to defend against an allegation that he
touched AR. at all with the intent to gratify his sexual desire. He could have, therefore,
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been found guilty simply by touching or kissing A.R. even if the jury did not believe that
he touched her breasts.
Further, the Idaho Supreme Court has stated:
As stated by the United States Supreme Court in Berger v. United States,
295 U.S. 78, 82, (1935): "The true inquiry ... is not whether there has
been a variance in proof, but whether there has been such a variance as
to 'affect the substantial rights' of the accused. The general rule that
allegations and proof must correspond is based upon the obvious
requirements (1) that the accused shall be definitely informed as to the
charges against him, so that he may be enabled to present his defense
and not be taken by surprise by the evidence offered at the trial; and (2)
that he may be protected against another prosecution for the same
offense."
Thus, under the prevailing state standard, a variance is held to require
reversal of the conviction only when it deprives the defendant of his right
to fair notice or leaves him open to the risk of double jeopardy.

Id. at 417-18,716 P.2d at 1189-90 (emphasis added.)
"The double jeopardy clause protects against a second prosecution for the same
offense after acquittal, protects against a second prosecution for the same offense after
conviction, and protects against multiple punishments for the same offense. Brown v.

Ohio, 432 U.S. 161, 97 S.Ct. 2221, 53 L.Ed.2d 187 (1977)." State v. Pizzuto, 119 Idaho
742, 756, 810 P.2d 680, 694 (1991), overruled on other grounds, State v. Card, 121
Idaho 425, 825 P.2d 1081 (1991) (emphasis added.) By not requiring the jury to make
a conclusion on the manner in which Mr. Ormesher committed the crime, the court left
Mr. Ormesher open to the risk of double jeopardy because it is not clear what specific
act Mr. Ormesher was convicted of. The variance in this case was, therefore, fatal.
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II.
The District Court Erred by Permitting The State To Cross Examine Curtis Ormesher
Regarding Mr. Ormesher's Prior Convictions

A.

Introduction
Mr. Ormesher asserts that the district court erred in concluding that his

convictions for stalking and violating a no-contact order were relevant to his
truthfulness. The district court therefore erred by permitting the State to cross-examine
Cu rtis Ormesher with these convictions.

B.

Standard Of Review
The district court should apply a two-prong test to determine whether evidence of

the prior conviction should be admitted: (1) the court must determine whether the fact or
nature of the conviction is relevant to the witness' credibility; and, (2) if so, the court
must determine whether the probative value of the evidence outweighs its prejudicial
impact. State v. Thompson, 132 Idaho 628,630 (1999).
In reviewing the district court's determination as to the first prong concerning
relevance, the standard of review is de novo. Id.

In reviewing the district court's

decision as to the second prong concerning whether the probative value of the evidence
outweighs its prejudicial impact, the standard of review is abuse of discretion. Id.

C.

The District Court Erred by Permitting The State To Cross Examine Curtis
Ormesher Regarding Mr. Ormesher's Prior Convictions
In this case, Curtis Ormesher testified that, in his opinion, Mr. Ormesher was

trustworthy. (Tr., p.360, Ls.2-8.) Idaho Rule of Evidence 405(a) provides,

Reputation or opinion. In all cases in which evidence of character or a
trait of a character of a person is admissible, proof may be made by
testimony as to reputation or by testimony in the form of an opinion. On
11

cross-examination, inquiry is allowable into relevant specific instances of
conduct.
I.R.E. 405(a). Mr. Ormesher asserts that the district court erred in finding evidence of
the prior convictions were relevant to cross-examination.
The district court found that "both of these offenses are probative as to the issue
of honesty of the defendant and this witness's, Mr. Curtis Ormesher's knowledge
regarding his opinion that's already stated as to the trustworthiness and honesty of the
defendant." (Tr., p.367, Ls.6-14.) The district court erred.
In the context of I.R.E 609,1 in State v. Ybarra, 102 Idaho 573, 634 P.2d 435
(1981), the Idaho Supreme Court recognized that different felonies have different
degrees of probative value on the issue of credibility.

"Some, such as perjury, are

intimately connected with that issue; others, such as robbery and burglary, are
somewhat less relevant, and 'acts of violence
bearing on honesty and veracity.'"

Id. at 580-81.

. generally have little or no direct
The Court has further stated that

"[t]he determination whether evidence of a particular felony conviction is relevant to
credibility depends on the particular facts and circumstances of each case and must
therefore be decided on a case-by-case basis." State v. Bush, 131 Idaho 22,31 (1997).
The case-by-case analysis referred to in Bush requires an "examination of the statute
under which the conviction which category the conviction falls, rather than "a record to
be made of the circumstances supporting conviction of the prior offense."

State v.

Muraco, 132 Idaho 130, 133 (1998).

Pursuant to I.R.E. 609, the district court must apply a two-prong test to determine
whether evidence of the prior conviction should be admitted: (1) the court must
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determine whether the fact or nature of the conviction is relevant to the witness'
credibility; and, (2) if so, the court must determine whether the probative value of the
evidence outweighs its prejudicial impact. State v. Thompson, 132 Idaho 628, 630, 977
P.2d 890, 892 (1999).

In this case, the district court held that the offenses were

relevant to Mr. Ormesher's credibility and were highly probative. (Tr., p.367, Ls.6-14.)
The district court erred.
Stalking and violating a no-contact order are not relevant to a witness's
truthfulness. In this case, the State made no offer of proof, and the district court made
no finding, that either the alleged stalking or no-contact order violation were committed
by deceitful means. In Idaho, a violation of a no contact order is committed when:
(a) A person has been charged or convicted under any offense defined in
subsection (1) of this section; and
(b) A no contact order has been issued, either by a court or by an Idaho
criminal rule; and
(c) The person charged or convicted has had contact with the stated
person in violation of an order.

I.e. § 18-920(2). Nothing in this statute suggests deceit is required by the violation of a
no contact order.
The State represented that Mr. Ormesher had been convicted of misdemeanor
stalking in Nevada. Nevada has the following definition of stalking:
person who, without lawful authority, willfully or maliciously engages in a
course of conduct that would cause a reasonable person to feel terrorized,
frightened, intimidated, harassed or fearful for the immediate safety of a
family or household member, and that actually causes the victim to feel
terrorized, frightened, intimidated, harassed or fearful for the immediate
safety of a family or household member, commits the crime of stalking.

1 While this case does not directly involve Rule 609, the district court specifically ruled
that Mr. Ormesher's prior convictions were relevant to his truthfulness, and, therefore,
analysis of whether a conviction would be admissible pursuant to Rule 609 is helpful.
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Except where the provisions of subsection 2 or 3 are applicable, a person
who commits the crime of stalking:
(a)

For the first offense, is guilty of a misdemeanor.

(b)

For any subsequent offense, is guilty of a gross misdemeanor.

Nev. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 200.575. Again, nothing in this statute suggests that deceit is
required. In fact, the statute requires that the victim actually feel "terrorized, frightened,
intimidated, harassed, or fearful," therefore requiring the defendant to make his or her
behavior known.
Unlike crimes like perjury or theft, which are inherently dishonest, the crimes the
State used to cross-examine Curtis Ormesher were not relevant to his reputation for
honesty. Nothing in the statutes demonstrates that the crimes are committed by deceit.
Because of this, the district court erred by concluding that the prior convictions were
relevant to Mr. Ormesher's truthfulness.

CONCLUSION
Mr. Ormesher respectfully requests that his conviction be vacated and his case
remanded for further proceedings.
DATED this 31 st day of January, 2012.

J~

Deputy State Appellate Public Defender
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